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Abstract
The present paper examines, within a dynamic framework, the use of
information provision as a policy instrument to supplement environmen-
tal taxation. We assume that at least a fraction of consumers do not
posses the required information to make the optimal choices, and that
their behavior at each time period depends on the accumulated stock of
information. We show that, as the accumulated stock of information pro-
vision increases, both the optimal level of information provided at each
period of time and the optimal tax rate decline over time. Our results
provide strong evidence in support of information campaigns as a policy
instrument to supplement traditional environmental policies. Information
provision can sift the demand towards environmentally friendly products
over time and thus, reduce the required level of the tax rate.
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1 Introduction
Balancing human needs with the health of consumers and the natural envi-
ronment may be the most pressing global concern of the twenty-first century.
Consumers are becoming more and more concerned about products contain-
ing substances that are toxic, carcinogenic or in general harmful to them in
their every day use and at the same time dangerous to the environment. Many
products, including food, electric and electronic products, tools and toys have
been proven to generate health damages to their users as well as environmental
damages that might in turn generate health problems to the wider population.
One such example that has been discussed extensively over the past decade
is the polyvinyl chloride (PVC), one of the largest-selling plastic in the world. It
is widely used in building, packaging, consumer goods (including oﬃce supplies
and toys), electronics industries and even in agriculture. During all phases of
PVC production, as well as during its use and disposal, poisonous chemicals
(dioxins) linked to cancer and birth defects are released. Therefore, PVC gen-
erate environmental damages1 at the same time that poses health risks2 to the
users of products containing PVC as well as to certain groups of people such as
the workers in the PVC industry, residents in the nearby areas and fire-fighters.
Similar problems are encountered with lead used in paints, asbestos used in
buildings and many other elements used in the production of goods. Further-
more, many household goods, including electric and electronic devices contain
toxic substances harmful to their users in the same time that their production
and disposal generates environmental damages. In the food sector one could
think of fruits and vegetables grown with the use of pesticides, which gener-
ate environmental externalities during production and also health problems to
consumers from residues of pesticides.
Individuals have incentives to reduce the consumption of such products, by
1Such as groundwater contamination, air pollution and in addition they cannot be eﬀec-
tivelly recycled.
2Which include angiosarcoma of the liver, lung cancer, brain cancer, lymphomas, leukemia,
and liver cirrhosis.
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choosing, if available, less harmful substitutes. However, consumers are bewil-
dered by - and often very skeptical about - the many health and environmental
claims made by manufacturers and retailers for their products. Consumer asso-
ciations and environmental groups could play a role in bridging the information
gap. However, the eﬀectiveness of these organizations is limited.3 Thus, there is
a clear need for government intervention, which over the years has taken diﬀer-
ent forms. In some cases governments have used direct policies banning the use
of particular substances in products.4 For example, in response to PVC’s toxic
threats, many governments around the world have passed policies to ban PVC
from the use of certain product (with priority given to toys and food packaging)
and switch to safer, healthier consumer products. Some governments have also
used environmental taxes to create economic incentives for reducing the demand
of such products. One such example is the Danish government’s tax on PVCs.
The above examples indicate a general transition of environmental policy
from the smokestacks and eﬄuent pipes towards the process of production and
finally to the consumption patterns, enriching in the same time, the policy in-
struments options with market-based approaches. However, due to the large
number of the products that generate health and environmental damages and
the complexity of their eﬀects, it is diﬃcult to address the problems only with
direct policies and/or economic instruments. For example, in the process of
switching to PVC-free products, the provision of information to consumers re-
garding the health risks of PVC has been proven extremely important. Infor-
mation provision is still very important in countries that have not yet banned
these products. Moreover, the importance of information provision has been
established by many studies in the case of public antismoking campaigns.5
3Liston-Heyes (2001), Heijnen and Schoonbeek (2008) and Heyes and Maxwell (2004) ex-
amine the role and the eﬀectiveness of environmental groups in informing consumers. These
works examine also the interplay between the environmental group and the polluting firms.
4 Such an example is the EU Directive on the Restriction on Use
of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) which can be accessed at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0095:EN:HTML.
5For example, Choo and Clark (2006) find that information play an important role in
encouraging particular groups of smokers to quit smoking. Their study is based on data
from an antismoking campaign in US and Canada in the early 1990. Farrelly et.al. (2005),
using data from an antismoking campaign in the US in early 2000, find that the campaign
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The role of information provision in complementing traditional environmen-
tal policies has been recognized by Tietenberg and Wheeler (2001). They oﬀer
a number of examples of products and processes that generate damages to in-
dividual consumers and to the environment and they also review the empirical
literature. They conclude that information provision can be an eﬀective pol-
icy instrument. Since consumers have incomplete and inaccurate information
regarding the health and environmental eﬀects of particular products, the gov-
ernment could intervene and provide reliable information to consumers. The
present paper addresses the issue of information provided by the government
to consumers and specifically the question of choosing the optimal mix of en-
vironmental taxation and information provision. We use a dynamic framework
in order to be able to take into account the lengthy process through which
information aﬀects consumers’ habits and attitudes.
In particular we examine the case of a diﬀerentiated product oﬀered in two
types, produced by two firms competing in prices. During its lifetime this
product generates environmental externalities (external damages) and at the
same time imposes damages on each individual user (individual damages). The
magnitude of both types of damages depends on the product type. We normalize
by assuming that one type of the product does not generate damages (clean
good), while the other type of the product (dirty good), generates both types of
damages. We assume that consumers take into account the individual damages
if they have relevant information. However, consumers’ knowledge (perception)
of individual damages is imperfect. For simplicity, we assume that there are two
groups of consumers, those that have knowledge of the individual damages and
those that they do not. Informed consumers substitute away from the dirty and
towards the clean good.
Within this framework the government imposes at each time period a tax
τ(t) and provides a flow of information a(t). We assume that consumers’ behav-
ior at each time period depends on the accumulated stock of information A(t)
accounted for a significant portion of the decline in youth smoking in the period after the
campaign. Pierce, Macaskill and Hill (1990) report similar results for an antismoking campaign
in Sydney, Australia in 1983, and in Melbourne in 1984.
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(state variable), rather than on currently provided information. More specifi-
cally, we assume that the stock of accumulated information A (t) influences the
composition of the two groups of consumers. The higher the stock of informa-
tion is, the more consumers behave as informed. Following the main stream
of the advertising literature we assume that consumers’ response to the stock
of information is S-shaped. At the initial stages of the information provision
campaign, consumers are more responsive to the information they receive, while
as the campaign develops consumers’ responsiveness slows down.
We derive the optimal paths for the two policy instruments and the optimal
steady states. We show that, under the assumptions of the model, two optimal
steady states exist at the maximum, from which only one is stable. The level
of the policy instruments depends on the rate at which information depreciates
over time, the cost of information provision and behavioral parameters. The
main result of our analysis is that the optimal tax rate declines over time as
the accumulated stock of information increases. Therefore, if the government
invests in informing people, shifting their consumption habits and attitudes,
there is not need to regulate as strict as before. Taxation does not have long-
lasting eﬀects; the same tax level has to be imposed each time period in order
to be eﬀective. Furthermore, apart from the bureaucratic costs, taxation re-
sults in eﬃciency losses which are increasing at the tax level. On the contrary,
information provision accumulates over time and does have long-lasting eﬀects.
As a result, the necessary level and the associated cost of information provi-
sion declines over time. Therefore, our analysis indicates that there are strong
arguments for using information provision to support environmental taxation.
Information provision is one of the two ways in which advertisement has
been analyzed in the economic literature. Some economists have emphasized the
information disseminating role of advertisement (both direct provision of infor-
mation or indirect in the form of signalling quality), assuming that consumers
are not fully informed and they receive through advertisement complete, costless
and instantly validated information (see for example Nelson (1974), Kotowitz
and Mathewson (1979a), Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) and Stigler (1961)).
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Others have advocated that advertisement alters consumers’ tastes resulting
in higher demand or lower demand elasticity for the advertised product (see
for example Galbraith (1958) and Dixit and Norman (1978)). Kotowitz and
Mathewson (1979b) examine the “persuasive” aspect of advertisement without
including advertisement into consumers’ utility. This paper examines the use
of environmental advertisement in the form of information provision as a public
policy instrument.
In the environmental economics literature there are only a few papers ad-
dressing the issue of environmental advertisement following either of the above
mentioned approaches. The most closely related work is Petrakis, et. al. (2005)
which in a similar framework shows —using static analysis— that information
provision could dominate, in some cases, environmental taxation in terms of
welfare and that a combination of these two policies is welfare improving. They
also examine the way in which each group of consumers is aﬀected by informa-
tion provision. The present paper diﬀers considerably since it employs a richer
structure of the way in which information provision aﬀects consumers’ behavior
and uses a dynamic framework.
An earlier study by Kennedy et. al. (1994) examines also environmental in-
formation provision. The framework of their analysis diﬀers substantially from
the current paper. It is assumed that the polluting good generates environmen-
tal damages (there are no individual damages) and consumers cannot relate with
certainty these damages to their utility. Information is provided to consumers at
a cost by private firms. The informed consumers know the true marginal exter-
nal damage and take into account the eﬀect that their own consumption has on
their utility. In the current paper we assume that each individual’s consumption
of the dirty good has a negligible eﬀect on the total external damage aﬀecting
her utility, and for that reason we do not introduce environmental damages
in individuals’ utility. Instead, we assume that there are individual damages
associated with the consumption of the dirty good. Furthermore Kennedy, La-
plante and Maxwell assume that the uninformed consumers have a belief over
the value of the marginal external damage which is positive and could exceed
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its true value. Under this assumption they show that even costless information
provision could decrease welfare. Contrary to our results they find that environ-
mental taxation alone can attain the social optimum since the only distortion is
the environmental externality. The only case in which public information provi-
sion can play a role is when taxation induces private information provision. The
structure of our model allows for a much richer role of information provided by
the government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
Section 3 presents the policy options, while Section 4 defines the optimal mix.
Section 5 presents the simulations using linear demand and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The model
Assume a horizontally diﬀerentiated product that generates individual and en-
vironmental damages. The product is oﬀered in two types, and the magnitude
of both individual and external damages diﬀers between them. For simplicity,
we normalize emission units so that the "clean" type of the product does not
generate any damages, while the "dirty" type generates positive individual and
external damages. We further assume that if consumers are informed, they take
into account the individual damages in making their consumption choices. Util-
ity derived from the dirty good shrinks due to the individual damages, while
that from the clean good expands as consumers learn about the bad charac-
teristics of the dirty good. The informed consumer derives higher utility from
the consumption of the clean relative to the dirty good. We denote the utility
diﬀerential per unit of consumed product by the parameter θ.
The utility of the representative informed consumer is,6
U(qc, qd, θ, γ) , (1)
6We assume that the utility derived from the two types of the product is linearly separable
from the utility of all other products. That is, total utility is U(qc, qd, θ, γ)+ I, where I is the
utility derived from the consumption of other goods. This assumption implies that there are
no income eﬀects and allows us to perform partial equilibrium analysis.
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where qj (j = c, d) are the quantities consumed of the clean and the dirty good
respectively and γ measures the degree of substitutability between the two types
of the product.7 Thus, we allow for two dimensions of product heterogeneity,
vertical product diﬀerentiation based on individual damages8 and horizontal
product diﬀerentiation based on variety. We further assume that the utility
function in (1) exhibits the standard properties to yield indiﬀerence curves that
are negatively sloped and strictly convex.
We further assume that only a fraction of the consumers are informed about
the individual damage that the dirty good generates. For simplicity, we assume
two groups of consumers, those with perfect knowledge of the negative eﬀect
associated with the dirty good and those that have no knowledge at all. The
informed consumers, which form μ fraction of the population, make their choices
based on the correct values of the parameter θ, while the uniformed consumers
set θ = 0. Thus, they are unable to distinguish between the two types of the
product in terms of individual damages and they diﬀerentiate between them
based only on γ. The total population of the consumers is normalized to unity.
Maximization of (1) subject to the budget constraint yields the direct de-
mand function for each type of the product,
qj(pj , pk, γ, θ) , (2)
where j, k = c, d, and j 6= k. The total demand for the clean and the dirty type of
the product is, Qd = μqdi + (1− μ)qdn and Qc = μqci + (1− μ)qcn respectively,
where qdi and qdn (qci and qcn) are the quantities of the dirty (clean) good
consumed by the informed and the uniformed consumer, respectively. That is,
qji ≡ qj(pj , pk, γ, θ) and qjn ≡ qj(pj , pk, γ), where j = c, d.
The product is oﬀered by two oligopolists, each oﬀering only one of the two
types of the product and they compete in prices. For simplicity we assume that
7The degree of substitutability between the two products reflects the fact that the product
is non homogeneous and its level aﬀects also the market structure. For example, in the linear
model we employ in Section 5, we assume that the two products are substitute and thus, γ
is striclty positive. If γ = 0, each firm has monopolistic market power, while if γ = 1, the
products are perfect substitutes.
8We assume that the only measure of quality in a vertical sense that is diﬀerent between
the two types of the product is θ.
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they both produce with the same technology and the production cost is C(qj),
with Cq > 0 and Cqq ≥ 0. Firm j’s profit maximization problem is,
max
pj
πj (pj , C(qj(pj , pk, γ, θ)), Qj (pj , pk, γ, θ, μ)) .
The first order condition of the profit maximization problem, π
0
j (pj , pk, γ, θ) =
0, yields oligopolist j’s reaction function pj = Rj(pk, γ, θ), assuming that each
oligopolist’s profit function is strictly concave on its own price everywhere, which
implies that the second order condition π
00
j < 0 for a maximum is satisfied. We
assume that both reaction functions exists, are interior solutions and given strict
concavity of the profit function are unique. We further assume that ∂πj/∂pj∂pk > 0,
which implies that the slope of the reaction function is positive, ∂Rj∂pk > 0,
making oligopolists’ prices strategic complements. The two oligopolists’ reaction
functions are solved for the Nash equilibrium prices, pj (z), where z is the vector
of demand and cost parameters including θ and γ.
3 Policy options
In the absence of any regulatory intervention, we have two distortions related to
the characteristics of the dirty good: first, an information asymmetry, since only
a fraction of the consumers take into account the individual damage, and second
an externality, one that cannot be eliminated even when all consumers are in-
formed. Assuming that the government does not intervene separately to correct
the market distortion arising from imperfect competition, any policy attempt-
ing to correct the two problems mentioned above, within a welfare maximizing
framework, would have to take into account the existing market distortion. In
what follows, we examine the case in which the regulator uses a combination of
a tax on the dirty good, τ , and information provision.
We model information provision as follows. The regulator provides a level
of information a(t) at each time period t. We assume that the provision of
information increases the proportion of consumers that behave as informed con-
sumers. However, it is not just the level of currently provided information that
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aﬀects the fraction of informed consumers but rather the stock of information
accumulated at time t. That is, we assume that while information provision
directly persuades consumers that are not currently informed, those who are
currently informed tend to forget and behave as uninformed.9 We denote the
stock of information at time t by A(t), which summarizes current and past infor-
mation provision eﬀorts. It is reasonable to assume that information provided
in the past is less eﬀective than currently provided information. We model this
assumption by treating information provision as a capital good,
A˙ = a− δA , (3)
assuming a constant rate of depreciation δ.10
We assume that when the stock of eﬀective information accumulated at time
t is A (t), then a fraction φ (A) of the uninformed consumers become informed.
The following properties for the informed consumers generating function (ICGF)
φ (A) are assumed,11
φ (A) : R+ → [0, 1] , φA (A) ≥ 0 , (4)
φ (0) = 0, φ
¡
A¯
¢
= 1, A¯ ≤ ∞ .
These assumptions mean that an increase in the stock of accumulated informa-
tion will never turn informed consumers to uniformed; zero information stock
could not generate informed consumers, while there could exist a finite level of
information stock at which all consumers become informed. We do not how-
ever restrict the ICGF to diminishing returns for A ∈ (0,∞) , which implies
9We assume that this decay in the number of informed consumers does not apply to the
initial fraction of consumers that behave as informed. These consumers have acquired their
information through diﬀerent channels and their behavior is not aﬀected by the government’s
information provision policy.
10The classical paper by Nerlove and Arrow (1962) introduced the following model of the
dynamic eﬀects of advertising: A˙ = a − δA, where A is the level of "goodwill" at time t,
which aﬀects consumers demand, a is the level of advertising (in monetary terms) at time
t and δ is the depreciation rate of "goodwill". This model has been used extensively in the
advertisement literature.
11To avoid misinterpretations we use, in many cases, subscripts to denote derivatives with
respect to a certain variable.
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that there could be intervals of increasing returns in the generation of informed
consumers. The ICGF shares common characteristics with the sales response
function to advertising which is commonly used in the advertisement literature.
Thus, in order to characterize the shape of ICGF we turn to the advertisement
literature. The view that advertisement exhibits some degree of economies of
scale is widely acceptable by both theoreticians and practitioners.12 Moreover,
in the most recent literature an S-shaped response function to advertisement has
been used extensively (see for example Feinberg (2001)). The S-shaped response
function implies increasing marginal returns to advertising for low advertising
levels followed, after an inflection point, by decreasing marginal returns. De-
spite the continuing debate on the shape of the advertising response function,13
we adopt the view that consumers’ response to the current stock of information
is S-shaped. Therefore, the ICGF exhibits the following properties, in addition
to those presented in (4),
φA ≥ 0, φA (0) ≥ 0, limA→∞φA (A) = 0 ,
∃Ainf : φAA ≥ 0 for A ∈ [0, Ainf ] and φAA < 0 for A ∈ (Ainf , A¯) ,
where Ainf denotes the ICGF’s inflection point.
Based on the above discussion, the fraction of the informed consumers m (t)
at each point of time is,
m (t) = μ+ (1− μ)φ (A (t)) ,
given an initial fraction of informed consumers μ, 0 ≤ μ < 1. The cost of
providing information to consumers, K(a), with K (0) = 0, is assumed to be
increasing, Ka > 0 at an increasing rate, Kaa > 0.14
12 It should be noted however, that there are some empirical studies showing little or no
evidence of substantial returns to scale in advertisement (see for example Arndt and Simon
(1983) and Seldona, Jewellb and O’Briena (2000)).
13 See for example Cannon, Leckenby, and Abernethy (2002) and Dube, Hitsch and Man-
chanda (2005).
14Grossman and Shapiro (1984) use an advertisement cost function with the same properties
in a model of product diﬀerentiation. In support of the assumption regarding the increasing
rate at which the cost of advertisement rises, they argue that "..it becomes increasingly ex-
pensive to reach higher fractions of the population, either because preferred media become
saturated, or because the target population is heterogeneous along a second dimension, namely,
the tendency to view ads." (p. 66).
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Within this policy framework, that is, a tax on the dirty good, τ , and infor-
mation provision, the two firms’ profit maximization problem is,
max
pc
πc = πc (pc, C(qj(pj, pk, γ, θ)), Qc (pcj , pd, γ, θ,m(φ (A))) ,
max
pd
πd = πc (pd, C(qj(pj , pk, γ, θ)), Qd (pd, pc, γ, θ,m(φ (A)) , τ) .
Given that the assumptions made in the previous section regarding the profit
and the resulting reaction functions hold, the oligopolists’ reaction functions are
solved for prices,
pj (τ , φ (A) ; z) . (5)
Oligopolists’ choice variables are now functions of the two policy instruments,
τ and A, in addition to cost and demand parameters presented by the z vector.
4 Optimal policy mix
Substituting the values of pc and pd from equation (5) into the direct de-
mand functions given in equation (2), yields qji(τ , φ(A); z) and qjn(τ , φ(A); z),
from which we obtain, Qj(t, φ(A); z), j = c, d. Substituting the values of
qji(τ , φ(A); z) and qjn(τ , φ(A); z) into the individual’s utility function yields the
indirect utility of the informed Vi(τ , φ(A); z), and the uniformed Vn(τ , φ(A); z)
consumer, both evaluated at the true values of θ. That is, in deriving the opti-
mal policy instruments, the regulator takes into account the full cost of the dirty
type of product and thus, it uses the true value of the uninformed consumer’s
utility, even though the consumer does not take into account the individual
damages when making her choices.
The regulator maximizes the present value of the sum of the consumer and
producer surplus, that is, v (φ(A), τ ; z) = mVi(τ , φ(A); z)+(1−m)Vn(τ , φ(A); z)−
c [Qc(τ , φ(A); z) +Qd(τ , φ(A); z)]−D(Qd(τ , φ(A); z)), whereD(Qd) are the dirty
good’s external damages, which we assume to be convex on dirty goods’ pro-
duction, D0and D00 > 0. The government chooses the optimal time paths for
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the tax τ(t) and information provision a(t) by solving the following problem,
max
{a(t),τ(t)}
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [v (φ(A), τ ; z)−K(a)] dt
subject to:
A˙ = a− δA A (0) = A0 ≥ 0
φ (A (t)) ∈ [0, 1] ,∀t ≥ 0
where ρ is the discount rate and K(a) is the cost of advertisement which we
assume to be increasing at an increasing rate, Ka and Kaa > 0. This is a formal
optimal control problem with a pure state constraint φ (A(t)) ∈ [0, 1] ,∀t ≥ 0.
The current value Hamiltonian for the optimal control problem is,
H = v (φ(A), τ ; z)−K(a) + λ (a− δA) + ξ1 (1− φ (A)) + ξ2φ (A) . (7)
where λ is the costate variable reflecting the shadow price of the stock of ac-
cumulated information and ξi, i = 1, 2 are multipliers associated with the pure
state constraint 0 ≤ φ (A) ≤ 1. The necessary conditions for the choice of the
optimal policy instruments a and τ yield,
∂H
∂a
= 0 or Ka = λ , and a0 = a (λ) , (8)
∂H
∂τ
= 0 or
∂v (φ(A), τ ; z)
∂τ
= vτ = 0 , and τ0 = τ (A) . (9)
The paths for λ and A evaluated at the optimal choices
¡
a0, τ0
¢
should
satisfy
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂H
∂A
, A˙ =
∂H
∂λ
. (10)
with ξi = 0, i = 1, 2 if 0 < φ (A) < 1. If the state constraint is not eﬀective,
then the multipliers can be set to zero. This means that in this case we study
interior solutions to the problem and the the optimal path for A (t) remains in
the interior of set
£
0, A¯
¤
such that φ (A (t)) ∈ (0, 1) for all t. For the rest of the
paper we consider interior solutions by assuming φ (∞) = 1, φ0 (0) > 0. Using
(8) and the fact that Kaaa˙ = λ˙ to eliminate λ and λ˙ from (10), the modified
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Hamiltonian dynamic system (MHDS) can be written in the control-state space
as:
a˙ = (ρ+ δ) a− 1
Kaa
vφφA , (11)
A˙ = a− δA, A (0) = A0 . (12)
An optimal steady state (OSS) in the stock A and the flow a of information
provision is defined as (A∗, a∗) : A˙ = 0, a˙ = 0. To study the properties of
the OSSs for interior solutions A∗ ∈ (0,∞) we make the following additional
assumptions:
• A1: The cost of advertisementK(a) is, without loss of generality, quadratic,
so that Kaa is a constant.
• A2: The social welfare functional v (φ(A), τ ; z) which defines, for given
parameters (τ , z), a map from the vector space containing φ to the real
numbers, has the following properties:
— The functional derivative (Fréchet derivative) Dv = vφ ≥ 0 is non-
negative and bounded, and Dv > 0 for A = 0.
— It holds for the second derivative D2v = vφφ ≤ 0
These assumptions imply that an increase in the fraction of the informed
consumers does not reduce social welfare, an increase in the fraction of the
informed consumer when the stock of eﬀective accumulated information is close
to zero increases social welfare and that the rate of increase in social welfare
from an increase in the fraction of informed consumers is non increasing.15
Proposition 1 Under assumptions A1 and A2 and an S-shaped ICGF two at
the most OSSs exist, 0 < A∗1 < A
∗
2 <∞. If two OSSs exist then the smaller one
is unstable , while the larger one is a local saddle point. If one OSS exists then
it is a saddle point.
15 It is verified that these assumptions are satisfied in our numerical simulations.
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Proof. A steady state occurs at the intersection of the isocline ψa (A)|a˙=0 =
vφφA
(ρ+δ)Kaa
, defined through 0 = (ρ+ δ) a− 1Kaa vφφA with the isocline ψ
A (A)
¯¯¯
A˙=0
=
δA defined through 0 = a−δA. Using A1 and A2 and our assumptions about φA
it follows that limA→0 ψa (A) > 0 and limA→∞ ψa (A) = 0. Furthermore since
φ is S-shaped φA (A) and therefore ψ
a (A)|a˙=0 are single peaked, with ψa (A)
increasing around A = 0 and asymptotically approaching zero as A → ∞. On
the other hand ψA (A) is a ray from the origin with positive slope δ. Therefore
ψa (A)|a˙=0 and ψA (A)
¯¯¯
A˙=0
will have in general zero, one, or two intersec-
tions.16 . The Jacobian matrix of the MHDS defined by (11) and (12) evaluated
at a steady state is:
J =
Ã
ρ+ δ − 1Kaa
³
vφφ (φA)
2
+ vφφAA
´
1 −δ
!
= J (a∗, A∗) . (13)
Since tr(J) = ρ > 0 and the eigenvalues of (13) are β1,2 =
1
2ρ±
p
ρ2 − 4 det (J),
where det (J) = −δ (ρ+ δ) + σ(A)Kaa , and σ (A) = vφφ (φA)
2
+ vφφAA, the steady
state will be either unstable or it will have the local saddle point property. If
σ (A) < 0, then det (J) < 0, the eigenvalues are real numbers, and thus the OSS
is a local saddle point. Given the assumptions A2, for σ (A) to be negative it suf-
fices that φAA < 0. Furthermore, since the slope of ψ
a (A) is dψ
a(A)
dA =
σ(A)
(ρ+δ)Kaa
,
then the saddle point OSS occurs at the declining part of the ψa (A) curve. On
the contrary, if σ (A) > 0, and det (J) > 0 then the OSS is unstable. However, a
necessary condition for σ (A) > 0 is that φAA > 0, while the suﬃcient condition
is vφφAA > −vφφ (φA)
2. Therefore, if the suﬃcient condition for σ (A) > 0
holds, the unstable OSS occurs at the increasing part of the ψa (A) curve. Since
ψA (A) is strictly increasing, if the pair (A∗1, A
∗
2) denotes the unstable and the
saddle point OSSs respectively, then 0 < A∗1 < A
∗
2 < ∞. If the ψa (A)|a˙=0 and
the ψA (A)
¯¯¯
A˙=0
intersect only once this can take place only at the declining part
of the ψa (A) isocline ant therefore the unique OSS is a saddle point. It should be
noted that, the maximized Hamiltonian H0 (q, λ) = maxaH (A, a, λ) is defined
as H0 (A, λ) = v (φ (A)) + λ
2
Kaa
− λδφ. If σ (A) < 0 the maximized Hamiltonian
16We do not consider hairline cases where the two isoclines are tangent.
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is concave in the state variable A, so the Arrow-Kurz suﬃciency condition for
the Pontryagin’s principle are satisfied at the saddle point OSS.
The possibility of none, one or two OSSs , resulting from the intersections of
the ψa (A)|a˙=0 and ψA (A)
¯¯¯
A˙=0
isoclines, is shown in figure 1. For saddle points,
A∗2 or A
∗ convergence takes place along the stable manifoldMM. For any initial
value of the information stock A, in the neighborhood of the steady state, there
exist an initial value of the flow of information provision a such that there is
convergence to the optimal steady state on the one dimensional manifoldsMM .
For example, if the initial stock of information is A0 the converging path is along
ME.
A
α
α=0
.
.
A=0
0
M
M
.
A=0
M
M .A=0
A1
* A2
* A*
α1
*
α*
A0
E
Figure 1. Optimal Steady State
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We can further characterize the optimal policy by considering a linearization
around an OSS (A∗, a∗) with the saddle point property which can be written asµ
a˙
A˙
¶
= J (A∗, a∗)
µ
a− a∗
A−A∗
¶
Let β1 be the negative eigenvalue of the Jacobian J (A∗, a∗) , then the linear
approximations of the optimal paths for the stock and flow of information in
the neighborhood of the steady state are,
a∗ (t) = C1ζ11e
β1t + a∗ , (14)
A∗ (t) = C1ζ21e
β1t +A∗ , (15)
where (ζ11, ζ21)
0 is the eigenvector associated with β1 and C1 is a constant
determined by initial conditions on A. Dividing the equations for the optimal
paths we obtain
a∗ (t) =
ζ11
ζ21
(A∗ (t)−A∗) + a∗ . (16)
This is the linear approximation of the policy function and indicates the optimal
amount of information provision at each point in time given the existing stock
of information provision. This policy function is a linear approximation of the
stable manifold in the neighborhood of the steady state.17
Having determined the optimal paths for information provision, the corre-
sponding optimal path for the tax τ∗ (t) can be obtained by solving the op-
timality condition (9) for τ (t), with A replaced by the optimal path A∗ (t) .
Therefore,
τ∗ (t) :
∂v (φ(A∗ (t)), τ∗ (t) ; z)
∂τ
= 0 . (17)
The trade-oﬀ between the stock of information provision and taxation, at
each point in time can be obtained by using the implicit function theorem in
(17) to obtain
dτ∗ (t)
dA∗ (t)
= − vτφφA
vττ
¯¯¯¯
A=A∗(t)
.
Let a∗ (t) = G (A∗ (t)) denote the optimal policy function in the neighbor-
hood of a steady state with the saddle point property, which can be defined
17Solution for the nonlinear stable manifold which will be the nonlinear policy function can
be obtained by using time elimination or multiple shooting methods.
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either as the linear approximation (16) or as a nonlinear function corresponding
to a stable manifold like M1M1 or M3M3 in figure 1. The monotonicity of the
policy function implies that an inverse policy function A∗ (t) = g (a∗ (t)) exists.
Substituting this function into (17) the trade-oﬀ between the two policy instru-
ments, that is environmental taxation and the flow of information provision,
along the optimal path can be defined as:
dτ∗ (t)
da∗ (t)
= − vτφφAga
vττ
¯¯¯¯
a=a∗(t)
.
5 Numerical results using linear demand
In this Section we utilize specific functional forms for the utility and cost func-
tions in order to obtain more tractable results for the model developed above. In
order to incorporate both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation characteristics,
the utility of the representative informed consumer is:18
U(qc, qd, θd, γ) = (α+ θc) qc + (α− θd)qd −
1
2
¡
q2c + q
2
d + 2γqcqd
¢
+ I ,
where I is the numeraire good produced by a competitive sector. Thus, utility
is quadratic in the consumption of qj goods and linear in the consumption of
other goods I. The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of substitutability
between the types of the product. In this paper we assume that the two types
of the product are less than perfect substitutes, that is, γ < γk < 1, where
γk is the critical value of the degree of substitutability guaranteeing that both
informed and uninformed consumers purchase, in all cases examined, positive
quantities of both types of the good.
The consumer’s utility maximization problem yields direct demands for each
good,
qc =
Ac +Θc
1− γ2 , qd =
Ad −Θd
1− γ2 , (18)
where Aj = (1− γ)α+ γpk − pj , and Θj = θj + γθk, with j, k = c, d, and j 6= k.
18A similar type of utility function has been introduced by Dixit (1979) and used in many
works such as Singh and Vives (1984). For a comprehensive and complete presentation, see
Martin (2002).
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For the ICGF we assume a simple algebraic sigmoid function of the following
form,
φ(A) =
A2
1 +A2
,
which is illustrated in figure2. This functional form satisfies all the properties
we have assumed in the general model and has an inflection point at Ainf = 1√3 .
1 2 3 4 5 6
A
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ϕHAL
1/v3
Figure 2. The ICGF sigmoid function
On the production side, in order to simplify the exposition, we assume that
the two oligopolists produce with the same constant marginal cost c. Each
firm’s profit maximization problem is,
max
pc
πc = (pc − c) [mqci + (1−m)qcn] ,
max
pd
πd = (pd − τ − c) [mqdi + (1−m)qdn] .
The reaction functions resulting from the duopolists’ profit maximization
problems are solved for the prices as functions of the two policy instruments,
pc =
B +mΘpc + γτ
4− γ2 , and pd =
B −mΘpd + 2τ
4− γ2 . (19)
19
where B = (2 + γ) [(1− γ)α+ c] and Θpj =
¡
2− γ2
¢
θj + γθk, with j, k = c, d
and j 6= k.
Substituting the values of pc and pd from equation (19) into the direct de-
mand functions given in equation (18), yields qji(τ , φ(A); z) and qjn(τ , φ(A); z),
from which we obtain, Qj(t, φ(A); z), j = c, d. Substituting the values of
qji(τ , φ(A); z) and qjn(τ , φ(A); z) into the individual’s utility function yields the
indirect utility of the informed Vi(τ , φ(A); z), and the uniformed Vn(τ , φ(A); z)
consumer, both evaluated at the true values of θ.
The regulator maximizes the present value of the sum of the consumer and
producer surplus, that is, v (φ(A), τ ; z), as defined in the theoretical part of the
paper. To further simplify the model we assume that the dirty good’s external
damages are linear in output, that is, D(Qd) = dQd. The cost of advertisement
is assumed to be quandratic K(a) = ω a
2
2 .
19 Each time period the government
chooses the optimal level of the tax τ(t) and information provision a(t) by
solving the maximization problem stated in the theoretical part of the paper.
In order to define the optimal steady state in the stock A and the flow a
of information provision (A∗, a∗), we set the following values for the model’s
parameters: a = 60, θ = 15, γ = 0.4, μ = 0.1, c = 15, ρ = 0.03, δ = 0.01,
ω = 100 and d = 20.
From the solution of the modified Hamiltonian dynamic system (MHDS),
equations (11) and (12), for A and a, we define the isoclines ψa (A)|a˙=0 and
ψA (A)
¯¯¯
A˙=0
which are presented in figure 3. For expositional purposes fig-
ure 3 presents only part of the ψa (A)|a˙=0 isocline. The two isoclines in-
tersect at two points. The coordinates of the first intersection, which corre-
sponds to point X in the diagram, are (0.0007929, 0.07929), and the coordi-
nates of the second, corresponding to point Z, are (0.128323, 12.8323). Recall
that we have shown in the general case that the optimal steady state point
corresponds to the intersection at the declining part of the ψa (A)|a˙=0 iso-
cline. The simulations confirm this result since the eigenvalues correspond-
ing to point X are complex with positive real parts, while the eigenvalues
19Tirole (1989), p. 293, employs this particular quadratic advertisement cost function.
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corresponding to point Z are real (−0.999846, 0.0175471). Therefore, in our
example, the optimal steady state with the local saddle point property corre-
sponds to a stock of advertisement A∗ = 12.8323 and a flow of advertisement
a∗ = 0.128323. At the optimal steady state a fraction φ(A∗) = 0.993964 of
uninformed consumers become informed and the total fraction of informed con-
sumers is m = μ+ (1− μ)φ (A∗) = 0.994567.
As in the general case, convergence to the optimal steady state occurs on the
manifold MM. Starting, in the neighborhood of Z, from any level of the stock
of information away from the optimal, the government can determine the path
of the flow of information a∗ (t) leading to the optimal OSS (A∗, a∗).
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Figure 3. Steady states in the linear example
Figure 4 depicts the tax τ as a function of the stock of information A, derived
from the optimality condition (9). When the stock of advertisement is zero, the
tax rate is high, since taxation attempts to correct both the externality and the
information asymmetry. As the stock of information is building up, the required
tax rate decreases, approaching its lowest value as the stock of advertisement
21
approached its optimal steady state value A∗. The curve depicting the optimal
tax response has a horizontally inverted S-shape, that is, there is a fast decrease
in the tax rate for low values of A and a slower decrease for higher levels of A.
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Figure 4. Tax response to changes in the stock of information
The numerical results of the linear demand model confirm the results of the
general model. There exist one, under the assumptions of our model, optimal
steady state with the saddle point property. As we approach the optimal steady
state the optimal tax level decreases.
6 Conclusions
It is beyond any dispute that the public, either as consumers, workers or in-
vestors can play an important role in shifting production towards more healthy
and environmentally safe products and processes if they have information about
health and environmental risks. However, these risks are rarely common knowl-
edge, and private firms that posses this information are unlikely to share them
with the public voluntarily. Thus, the government has an incentive to provide
22
reliable information in order to complement existing policies. The present pa-
per examines the case of products that are responsible for both environmental
and health damages. Given that consumers have incomplete information about
health and environmental risks, we examine the role of information provision in
supporting environmental taxation. We find that the combination of the two
policy instruments is eﬃcient since information provision results in lowering con-
sumption of the good generating health and environmental damages and thus,
it reduces the need for environmental taxation. Over time both the optimal tax
rate and the degree of information provision decline resulting in declining costs,
while the benefits are increasing.
Although in the present paper we do not introduce environmental damages
in individuals’ utility, a natural extension would be to examine cases in which
consumers are willing to internalize part of the external damages they generate.
In such cases, the government could provide the appropriate information in order
to convince the public to, at least partially, internalize part of the environmental
cost.
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